### 1

#### Economic engagement must be a direct trade transaction – anything else is political

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.¶ Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.¶ A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 2

#### Congress will raise the debt ceiling and avoid a shutdown now – but it’ll be a tough fight

The Detriot News 9/19/13 (Dale McFeatters, "Another Debt Ceiling Debate?")

The tea party-influenced wing of the House GOP favors passing the CRs but cutting any funds in those bills that would go toward paying for Obamacare. About two dozen House Republicans are in favor of this scheme.¶ But since neither President Barack Obama nor Senate Democrats would go along with this, House Republicans risk shutting down all or parts of the government. The House Republicans’ leadership, which bears no love for Obamacare, thinks this is a terrible idea.¶ National polls and the GOP’s internal polling show that the public would generally blame Republicans for the shutdown and likely take it out on the party in the next election.¶ The beleaguered Republicans who lead the House — Speaker John Boehner, Majority Leader Eric Cantor and whip Kevin McCarthy — prefer to wait until month’s end, when Congress must vote to raise the debt ceiling.¶ Failure to raise the debt limit means the government will begin defaulting on its debts, with dire and unpredictable consequences. Boehner has pledged not to let the government default. But he wants to tie the increase in the debt ceiling to tax reform, which would likely entail cuts in entitlements — anathema to most Democrats.¶ Obama and Senate Democratic leaders say they will not negotiate over the debt limit and have begun making the argument that failing to raise it is unconstitutional and that Congress’ permission might not even be necessary.¶ At a sensitive time in the nation’s economic recovery, the administration could face economic chaos. Younger House Republicans believe Obama would back down. However, faced with growing charges that his leadership is weak and uncertain, the president almost dare not.

#### Engagement with Mexico sparks backlash – Congress doesn’t trust Mexico

AP ‘13

(5/2/13, Associated Press, “Obama to Pitch Immigration Overhaul in Mexico” <http://www.newsmaxworld.com/Newsfront/obama-immigration-mexico-trip/2013/05/02/id/502393>)

For Pena Nieto, Obama's visit is a chance for him to showcase his country's economic gains. After suffering along with the U.S. during the recession, its economy is now growing at a better clip than that of the U.S. Per capita income has gone from an annual $7,900 two years ago to $10,146. ¶ ¶ But Diana Negroponte, a Latin America expert at the Brookings Institution, says corruption remains endemic, human rights are still a problem, and efforts to change and improve the judicial system have been too slow.¶ ¶ "There is concern on our side of the border that greater help needs to be given in order for Mexico to reform its system," she said.¶ ¶ Pena Nieto's changes in the security relationship with the U.S. have prompted some U.S. officials to speculate that the new president might be embracing the policies of his Institutional Revolutionary Party, which long has favored centralized political and bureaucratic control.¶ ¶ Among those watching the new steps is Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., who has held up $228 million sought by the Obama administration for Mexico under a security cooperation agreement. Under the agreement, known as the Merida Initiative, Congress has already given Mexico more than $1.9 billion in aid since 2008.¶ ¶ But Leahy, chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the State Department budget, has been a critic of how the money has been used and with the results.¶ ¶ "Congress has been asked for a significant new investment, but it's not clear what the new Mexican government's intensions are," Leahy said in a statement to The Associated Press. "We're in a period of uncertainty until we know enough to be able to reset that part of our relationship. I'm not ready to sign off on more money without a lot more details."

**Obama’s push is key**

**Lillis and Wasson 9/7**, Mike, the Hill writer, Erik, the Hill writer, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote,” 9/7, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats#ixzz2fOPUfPNr

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria. **Obama needs** all the political capital he can muster **heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling**. Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies. But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East. “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said. Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles. "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "**We need a** maximally strong president **to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."**

#### Government shutdown cuts cyber-infrastructure

Sideman 11 – online content producer for Washington Technology (Alysha, “Agencies must determine computer security teams in face of potential federal shutdown With cybersecurity threats on the rise, essential IT staff would be much bigger than in 1995”, February 23 of 2011, <http://fcw.com/Articles/2011/02/23/Agencies-must-determine-computer-security-teams-in-face-of-shutdown.aspx?Page=1>)

With the WikiLeaks hacks and other threats to cybersecurity present, guarding against cyberattacks has become a significant part of governing -- especially because most government agencies have moved to online systems.¶ As a potential government shutdown comes closer, agencies must face new questions about defining “essential” computer personnel. Cyber threats weren’t as significant during the 1995 furlough as they are today, reports NextGov. The publication adds that agencies need to buck up and be organized.¶ In late January, government officials, NATO and the European Union banded together in Brussels to formulate a plan to battle cyber bandits, according to Defense Systems.¶ Leaders there agreed that existing cybersecurity measures were incomplete and decided to fast-track a new plan for cyber incident response.¶ Meanwhile, observers are wondering whether the U.S. government has a plan to deal with cyberattacks in the case of a shutdown.¶ The lists of essential computer security personnel drawn up 15 years ago are irrelevant today, computer specialists told NextGov.¶ In 1995, the only agencies concerned about cybersecurity were entities such as the FBI and CIA. Today, before any potential government shutdown happens, a plan of essential IT personnel should be determined, the specialists add.¶ Agencies should be figuring out which systems will need daily surveillance and strategic defense, as well as evaluating the job descriptions of the people operating in those systems, former federal executives told NextGov.¶ Hord Tipton, a former Interior Department CIO, agrees. “If they haven’t done it, there’s going to be a mad scramble, and there’s going to be a hole in the system,” he told the site.

**That causes retaliation and nuclear war**

**Tilford 12** Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, “Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast” 2012, <http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa>

To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military.¶ The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.”¶ “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said.¶ Which means military **command and control centers could go dark**.¶ Radar systems that detect air threats to our country **would shut Down completely**.¶ “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley.¶ “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record).¶ So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this?¶ Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_kVQrp\_D0kY&feature=relmfu ).¶ A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response.¶ That could include the use **of “nuclear weapons**”, if authorized by the President.

### 3

Text: The European Union ought to include the United Mexican States in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

### 4

#### The aff’s fear of protectionism is epistemologically bankrupt because they glorify an ideologically insulated Anglo-American system of free trade as the natural way of the world – we must repoliticize alternatives to free trade lest people who do NOT practice free trade become demonized as irrational and expendable.

James **Fallows**, national correspondent for the Atlantic, BA in history and literature from Harvard and was a Rhodes Scholar @ Oxford for economics, **1993**, “How the World Works”, The Atlantic online, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/12/how-the-world-works/5854/>

WHY Friedrich List? The more I had heard about List in the preceding five years, from economists in Seoul and Osaka and Tokyo, the more I had wondered why I had virtually never heard of him while studying economics in England and the United States. By the time I saw his books in the shop beneath the cherry trees, I had come to think of him as the dog that didn't bark. He illustrated the strange self-selectivity of Anglo-American thinking about economics. I emphasize "Anglo-American" because in this area the United Kingdom and the United States are like each other and different from most of the rest of the world. The two countries have dominated world politics for more than a century, and the dominance of the English language lets them ignore what is being said and thought overseas—and just how isolated they have become. The difference shows up this way: The Anglo-American system of politics and economics, like any system, rests on certain principles and beliefs. But rather than acting as if these are the best principles, or the ones their societies prefer, Britons and Americans often act as if these were the only possible principles and no one, except in error, could choose any others. Political economics becomes an essentially religious question, subject to the standard drawback of any religion—the failure to understand why people outside the faith might act as they do. To make this more specific: Today's Anglo-American world view rests on the shoulders of three men. One is Isaac Newton, the father of modern science. One is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the father of liberal political theory. (If we want to keep this purely Anglo-American, John Locke can serve in his place.) And one is Adam Smith, the father of laissez-faire economics. From these founding titans come the principles by which advanced society, in the Anglo-American view, is supposed to work. A society is supposed to understand the laws of nature as Newton outlined them. It is supposed to recognize the paramount dignity of the individual, thanks to Rousseau, Locke, and their followers. And it is supposed to recognize that the most prosperous future for the greatest number of people comes from the free workings of the market. So Adam Smith taught, with axioms that were enriched by David Ricardo, Alfred Marshall, and the other giants of neoclassical economics. The most important thing about this summary is the moral equivalence of the various principles. Isaac Newton worked in the realm of fundamental science. Without saying so explicitly, today's British and American economists act as if the economic principles they follow had a similar hard, provable, undebatable basis. If you don't believe in the laws of physics—actions create reactions, the universe tends toward greater entropy—you are by definition irrational. And so with economics. If you don't accept the views derived from Adam Smith—that free competition is ultimately best for all participants, that protection and interference are inherently wrong—then you are a flat-earther

**Extinction---tech and reforms fail -** The alternative is to de-link from Latin America

Richard A. Smith 7, Research Associate at the Institute for Policy Research & Development, UK; PhD in History from UCLA, June 2007, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 22-43

In the midst of the record-breaking heat wave in the summer of 2003, George Monbiot, the renowned columnist for the London Guardian, penned a short but eloquent essay entitled "Sleepwalking to Extinction." Monbiot wrote: We live in a dreamworld. With a small, rational part of our brain, we recognize that our existence is . . . destroying the conditions for human life on earth. Were we governed by reason, we would be on the barricades today, dragging the drivers of Range Rovers and Nissan Patrols out of their seats, occupying and shutting down the coal-burning power stations, bursting in upon the Blairs' retreat from reality in Barbados and demanding a reversal of economic life as dramatic as the one we bore when we went to war with Hitler.1 But despite the frightening trends and increasingly desperate pleas from the world's scientists, the world's corporate and political leadership show no sign of abandoning denial and adopting "reason" nor scrapping business-as-usual to mobilize against catastrophe. The ritual has now become depressingly familiar and predictable: After each new "shocking" report on melting icecaps, the slowing Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic, or eco-devastation in Africa or China, "concerned" politicians call for "immediate action" and "drastic steps" to curb emissions but then do nothing of substance. Successive post-Kyoto talks begin with urgent pleas from devastated Third World peasants and expert scientists, then collapse in disagreement. At every turn, the priority of growth and profits overrides every ringing alarm, and society carries on in its "sleepwalk to extinction." In the latest rehearsal of this charade, the United Nations talks on climate change in Nairobi in November 2006 collapsed with no firm targets adopted and every issue of any seriousness postponed yet again. Then-UN secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decried the assembled ministers as "frighteningly timid," "lacking in leadership" and said they displayed "a failure of political will." One Greenpeace observer remarked that "the glaciers in Greenland are moving faster than the negotiators."2 The Nairobi session came just after Britain's Treasury secretary and former World Bank chief economist, Sir Nicholas Stern, sounded the latest alarm with his own blistering report laying down a challenge to Britain, the U.S., and developing nations like China and India that the planet faces imminent catastrophe unless urgent measures are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions immediately. Stern's warning went beyond restating an apocalyptic vision of hundreds of millions fleeing floods and drought; it struck at the heart of the corporate resistance to environmental measures by demonstrating that the cost of inaction could result in the permanent loss of perhaps 20 percent of global output, while the cost of preventive action right now is as little as 1 to 2 percent of global gross national product (GNP). By illustrating the huge economic cost that inaction will impose on the industrialized economies, Stern's report should have knocked the last leg out from under the "environment versus economy" argument. Reiterating the conclusions of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scientists, Stern warned that just to stabilize CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at between 450 and 500 parts per million, we will have to cut global emissions by 25 percent and wealthy country emissions by 60 percent by 2050. Presenting the findings in London, Prime Minister Tony Blair said the consequences of inaction were "literally disastrous" and warned: This disaster is not set to happen in some science fiction future many years ahead in our lifetime. We can't wait the five years it took to negotiate Kyoto-we simply don't have the time . . . Without radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years, there is compelling evidence to suggest that we might lose the chance to control temperature rises."3 The Stern report came just as the International Energy Agency announced that China, which is commissioning a new coal-fired power plant every five days, will surpass the United States in 2009-nearly a decade ahead of previous predictions-as the world's biggest emitter of carbon dioxide.4 Largely because of China's growth, the Global Carbon Project reported in the November 13, 2006 issue of Nature that "Global carbon emissions are now growing by 3.2 percent a year... That's four times higher than the average annual growth of 0.8 percent from 1990-1999 . . . We are not on any of the stabilization paths." Professor Bill McGuire, director of the Benfield Hazard Research Center in London, said: "This is more very bad news. We need a 60 to 70 percent cut in emissions, but instead, emission levels are spiraling out of control. The sum total of our meager efforts to cut emissions amounts to less than zero."5 The Necessity of Hypocrisy So what sort of "radical measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the next ten to fifteen years" do Blair and Stern propose to stop this onrushing catastrophe? None. After all their rhetoric about impending disaster, the best they could do was call for more "carbon pricing," "more research into new technologies," and "robust international agreements." They specifically rejected mandatory limits on emissions as "too inflexible" and-most crucially-have nothing whatsoever to say about the implications of inexorable growth. On the face of it, this was a completely inadequate response to the crisis, and Blair was immediately chastised by his own party for resisting binding targets.6 After all, carbon pricing schemes, notably in the EU, have already proved to be a colossal failure since economic growth has just barreled through the Kyoto carbon "limits." And what possible technical breakthroughs could cut global CO2 emissions by 60 percent, particularly in the ten-to-fifteen-year timeframe Blair says we must act in order to save ourselves, when China is adding a new coal-fired power plant every week and coal-fired plants are still being built in the United States.7 Nearly everywhere, we see that despite the increased energy efficiency and installation of pollution controls in cars or power plants, without limits to growth these gains are outstripped by ever-increasing production. So instead of CO2 emissions falling, globally emissions are actually accelerating.8 And CO2 emissions are only one-and perhaps not the even the worst-of the oncoming ecological catastrophes we face. Around the world, forests are also vanishing, clean water is disappearing, coral reefs are dying off, species after species is being driven to extinction, resource after resource is being exhausted; everywhere the natural world is being systematically plundered and sacrificed to the god of relentless growth, profits and consumption.9 The Inconvenient Truth Al Gore Does Not Want to Face Blair's contradictions are entirely predictable, rational, and necessary from the standpoint of his capitalist perspective, because the problems he faces are systemic, built into the logic of capitalist economics, and thus unsolvable within the framework of capitalism. The solution to the threat of global warming is obvious: The only way to cut emissions by 60 to 70 percent in the next ten to fifteen years-barring some as yet unknown technical miracle-is by drastically cutting production, output and consumption, particularly in the advanced industrial economies. Al Gore says we face an "inconvenient truth": consume less, conserve more-or die. The problem is the admonition to consume less has to translate into the reality of consuming less-less oil, electricity, steel, aluminum, wood, paper, plastic, fabric, beef, fish, and so on. That, in turn, can only mean producing fewer cars, airplanes, kitchen remodels, fashions, resort vacations, TVs and TV shows, hamburgers and Starbucks Frappuccinos-i.e., converting less of nature into consumable commodities to give a break to the fish, forests, oceans, atmosphere, and all the other natural resources exploited to support the capitalist consumer lifestyle. This is the really inconvenient truth that no investor, labor union, government, mainstream environmental organization, nor anyone of us-including Al Gore-wants to face.10 But this is the truth we have to face if we want to survive. Despite the difficulty such a massive challenge poses, it does not mean that people have to starve. On the contrary, if we do not make these cuts and restructure the global economy, not only will millions soon die from starvation, floods, drought and other catastrophes, but the capitalist engine of ecodestruction will drive humanity to the brink of collapse, if not extinction. The problem is, given the requirements of capitalist reproduction, particularly the need to meet shareholder demands for growing profits, no corporation can cut production and stay in business. Furthermore, any broad effort to slow production and consumption would only bring on market collapse and economic depression. So, as long as Blair, Stern, Al Gore, and the rest of the corporate and political elite are committed to maintaining and perpetuating global capitalism as their first and foremost priority, they have no choice but to subordinate the environment to growth and consumption, override their own environmental targets, turn themselves into hypocrites, and doom the future of humanity. To imagine, as they do, that technical innovations, carbon taxes, "green shopping" and the like will allow production and consumption to spiral endlessly upward and consume evermore resources while pollution and emissions spiral downward is to live in a delusional dreamworld of faith-based economics that has no empirical basis.11 Through most of human history up to around the 17th century, humanity suffered from class structures that put brakes on productivity growth, institutionalized underproduction as a regular feature of economic life, and so brought on periodic famines and demographic collapse. But since the advent of the capitalist mode of production, humanity has both benefited-but also increasingly suffered-from the opposite problem: crises and consequences of overproduction, which have typically taken the form of economic crashes and depression. Today, this engine of relentless technological revolution and productivity growth has built an economy of such power, capacity and scale that it is systematically destroying the very ecological basis of human life. The Smithian Operating System To understand why the free market can't solve our global environmental crisis, the place to start is with an examination of the logic and contradictions of capitalist economics-the economics of Adam Smith. Needless to say, Smith can't be held responsible for the problems and consequences of capitalist development. But Smith's economic theory is a metonym - the language of capitalism, its intellectual "operating system." For it was Smith, the original and foremost theorist of capitalism, who first discovered and elaborated the organizing principle of capitalist economic life, which he famously termed the "invisible hand." Smith found it remarkable that in what he called "commercial society" (what we today call capitalism), no one looks out for the "general welfare" of society as such. Yet somehow, the provision of the necessities of life-e.g., enough food, clothes, housing, and transportation-so that society can carry on from day-to-day and year-to-year seems to more or less unconsciously get taken care of. In some of the most famous phrases in all of economic literature Smith asserted: In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it grows up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want . . . and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages . . . (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 1, p. 14.)12 And again that: Every individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II, p. 423.)13 Smith's insight, one of the most powerful and elegant concepts in the history of capitalist economics, grasps the essence of the market system-namely, production for exchange, specialized division of labor, and mutual dependence of all producers/commodity sellers/consumers upon one another through the market. This is what distinguishes the market system from all previous economic systems, such as communal tribal society, slavery, and feudalism-all of which were, in one way or another, systems based overwhelmingly on direct production for use rather than for exchange. For example, in pre-capitalist economic systems like medieval agrarian Europe, farm production was planned and largely for direct use. The basic unit of rural production was the peasant family with its farm, rudimentary tools and livestock. Peasant farmers not only grew their own food but often made their own clothes, fabricated most of their own tools, and built their own houses. Peasants produced mostly for subsistence and, where they were enserfed, to pay rents to feudal landlords, tithes to the church, and sometimes additional obligations to the state. Beyond this, those who could produce and retain some surplus over subsistence, rent, and tithe obligations sold it in local town markets to procure the few necessities they could not produce for themselves on the farm or in the lord's demesne shops, such as metal for plows or tools. In the villages, patriarchal family households organized the day-to-day operations of farm life, determining which crops to grow and when, and assigning a division of labor within the family. They planned this production based on their foreknowledge of what their family unit needed to carry on from year-to-year-how much and what kinds of crops and animals to raise, and how much labor to devote to farming, husbandry, and building upkeep. More often than not, because village agricultural regimes required village-wide cooperation to regulate seasonal plantings, field rotations, harvest, and commons management, peasant farmers collectively planned and regulated their seasonal work rhythms in cooperation with their neighbors according to the custom and village bylaws in tightknit village communities. Throughout Europe, most rural agrarian output was directly consumed on the farm, in the hamlets and villages. The feudal aristocracy consumed the surpluses directly and marketed some of their surpluses in urban markets to purchase luxury goods and military equipment. In short, rural Europe, at least up to the 15th century, was in a sense a "planned" economy-or more precisely, consisted of masses of miniature planned village economies.14 By Adam Smith's day in the late 18th century, rural peasant village self-sufficiency with its limited division of labor had largely given way to generalized production for market throughout England and parts of Western Europe. In this new "commercial" economy, Smith observed there is no general economic "plan." No one plans production for the self-sufficient family anymore. Production is now specialized and geared for the whole society-and it is to society that one must turn to satisfy one's own needs. No one knows how much wheat or wool, how many shoes, coats, ships, or wagons society needs, or when they are needed. No one consciously divides up and assigns society's labor to the various tasks of producing all that society requires over any given period of time.15 And yet out of the unconscious "mindlessness" of this system, a spontaneous order emerges. Society seems to be "guided by an invisible hand" to produce more or less of these goods so that we can carry on from day-to-day to ensure social reproduction. By the developing 18th-century capitalist economy of Adam Smith's era, most producers no longer possessed their own means of subsistence, or at least full subsistence. Masses of peasant farmers had been cleared off the land and proletarianized by centuries of enclosure movements. Peasant subsistence farms, with all their variety of produce, had been replaced with wheat farms or sheep folds. The hand loom weaver, village blacksmith and most small-scale hand manufacturers were giving way to large-scale factory production with a specialized division of labor and, increasingly in the late 18th century, mechanization. Without full access to the means of subsistence, everyone in capitalist society must specialize to produce a commodity for market or sell their labor power to work for an employer who does possess the means of production.16 So to win one's own bread in the capitalist organization of production, virtually everyone, including the capitalists, must continuously sell their specialized commodity on the market in order to continuously purchase their own means of subsistence and the means of production to re-enter production.17 In this way, all commodity producers/sellers are dependent upon the labor of others.18 How do these specialist commodity producers/sellers know in advance how much of their particular commodity-wheat, cloth, bricks, horseshoes, board feet of lumber, barrels, etc.-society "needs" in any given year or how much they will sell? They don't. Typically they estimate from what they sold the previous year, and hope to sell their product for at least as low a price as others offering the same commodity. Thus, society's "need" for any particular commodity is determined after the fact by the price at which it sells, what Smith called "effectual demand." If demand and prices are high for some particular commodity, Smith says producers will "employ more labor and stock in preparing and bringing it to market." If demand falls, producers will "withdraw a part of their labor or stock from this employment" and redeploy those resources in some other line of production.19 So if the market is glutted with wheat, but wool is in short supply and prices are high, some farmers will turn to raising sheep. If demand is low for ships but high for houses, some carpenters will switch from building ships to building houses. And so on, until the supply and demand come roughly into balance, what economists today call "equilibrium."20 That's the beauty and efficiency of the market system, as mainstream economists never tire of telling us. Engine of Development: Production for Exchange and its Imperatives This mutual dependence of each and every person through the market entrains a number of powerful implications. Foremost among these are the implications that flow from competition in the marketplace. Commodity sellers don't have the freedom to charge what they wish, because they must be able to sell at prices close to the competition if they are to compete. The specific strategies and methods producers must adopt to survive against the competition shape the overall pattern of economic development of capitalism as a system and also distinguish it from every other economic system: Producers must strive to cut the cost of inputs, which means seeking out ever-cheaper sources of raw materials and labor. Producers must continuously increase the efficiency of their units of production by innovating, bringing in more advanced labor-saving machinery to boost productivity, and substituting newer and cheaper raw materials inputs. So unlike the ruling classes of pre-capitalist economies, capitalists are not free to consume their surpluses in conspicuous consumption but must reinvest much of their profits back into productivity-enhancing technologies and skills to develop the forces of production. Competition compels producers to strive to grow by maximizing sales, expanding existing markets, seeking out and creating new markets and commodities-or see them developed by the competition, and thus see their stock value fall as the penalty for complacency. As eloquent as Adam Smith was, no one captured the broader developmental implications of capitalist economics better than Karl Marx. In some of the most prescient phrases in all of economic literature, Marx wrote in his Communist Manifesto: The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society ... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned . . . The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?21 By comparison, pre-capitalist modes of production contained no such engine of development or drive to "constantly revolutionize" the instruments and relations of production. Technological advance under slavery and feudalism was agonizingly slow, and economic stagnation was the norm. When productivity growth could not keep pace with population growth, economic collapse and famine followed. Even the Stalinist bureaucratic mode of production in Russia and China contained no such built-in drive to development. Post-revolutionary Russia and China rapidly developed and industrialized to a considerable extent, but the bureaucratic system was not powered by any self-active motor. Development depended entirely on the conscious actions and direction of central planners, but for the same reason, it was also severely limited and handicapped by the bureaucracy's inability to push development beyond certain limits. In particular, these bureaucrats lacked the weapons of unemployment and bankruptcy to discipline producers, force productivity increases, or generate innovation and development.22 Without competition to force producers to innovate and become more efficient, top-down bureaucratically driven development was no match for the dynamic growth of global capitalism. This engine of development has brought the most prodigious development of the forces of production of any mode of production in history, lifting the living standards of billions of people the world over. So it was no surprise that since the spectacular collapse of communism and the global triumph of capitalism in the 1990s, Smithian economics has been crowned with a sacred halo, unquestioned and self-evident to the churched.23 Today, Smith's theory, rebranded for today's market under the neoclassical and neoliberal labels, is entrenched in every economics department from Berkeley to Beijing. Engine of Planetary Eco-collapse: The Collective Irrationality of Individualist Economics In his 1996 book The Future of Capitalism, Lester Thurow lucidly captured the socially suicidal aggregate impact of individualistic economic decision-making: Nowhere is capitalism's time horizon problem more acute than in the area of global environmentalism .. . What should a capitalistic society do about long-run environmental problems such as global warming or ozone depletion? . .. Using capitalist decision rules, the answer to what should be done today to prevent such problems is very clear-do nothing. However large the negative effects fifty to one hundred years from now might be, their current discounted net present value is zero. If the current value of the future negative consequences are zero, then nothing should be spent today to prevent those distant problems from emerging. But if the negative effects are very large fifty to one hundred years from now, by then it will be too late to do anything to make the situation any better, since anything done at that time could only improve the situation another fifty to one hundred years into the future. So being good capitalists, those who live in the future, no matter how bad their problems are, will also decide to do nothing. Eventually a generation will arrive which cannot survive in the earth's altered environment, but by then it will be too late for them to do anything to prevent their own extinction. Each generation makes good capitalist decisions, yet the net effect is collective social suicide.24 Lester Thurow, virtually alone among mainstream economists as near as I can tell, has recognized this potentially fatal contradiction of capitalism-even though he is no anti-capitalist and wrote the book from which this excerpt is drawn in the hopes of finding a future for capitalism. Until very recently, the standard economics textbooks ignored the problem of the environment altogether. Even today, the standard Economics 101 textbooks of Baro, Mankiv and other mainstream economists contain almost no mention of environment or ecology.25 This reflects the increasingly rightward drift of the discipline since the 1970s. The American economics profession has long since abandoned the practice of critical scientific thought and seriously considering dissenting views. Today, an almost totalitarian "neoliberal" religious dogma rules the discipline. Keynesianism, social democracy, and Marxism are dismissed as hopelessly antiquated. Ecological economics is considered suspect. And the prudent graduate student is well advised to steer clear of all such interests if he or she wants to find a job.26 As Francis Fukuyama put it some years back, history has reached its penultimate apogee in free market capitalism and liberal democracy. The science of economics, Fukuyama pronounced, was "settled" with Adam Smith's accomplishment. The future would bring no more than "endless technical adjustments;" thus no further theoretical thought is required."27

### Manufacturing

#### Industry resilient – 10 year growth trend

Wolf, 12 – Correspondent for Reuters (“U.S. aerospace industry sees 10th straight growth year”, Dec. 5th, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/05/us-aerospace-us-idUSBRE8B41EI20121205)

(Reuters) - U.S. aerospace and arms companies are poised for 2.8 percent overall sales growth next year to about $224 billion, which would mark their 10th straight year of growth, barring steep Pentagon budget cuts, the industry's chief trade group said on Wednesday. The forecast does not factor in so-called sequestration, a process that would lop about 10 percent off Pentagon arms purchases starting next month if Republicans and Democrats fail to agree on a new plan to pare federal deficits. Exports of civil aircraft, engines and parts - which represent about 88 percent of all aerospace exports - are expected to account for most of the industry's sales growth in 2013. The U.S. military aircraft sector, on the other hand, continues to shrink even as foreign sales of U.S. warplanes are booming. Aerospace and arms companies, one of the economy's perennial bright spots, continued to lead the United States in the net export of manufactured goods, buoyed by strong civil aircraft sales, the Aerospace Industries Association said in its annual year-end review and forecast. Exports rose 12 percent to an estimated $95.5 billion this year from $85.3 billion last year and are likely to grow during "at least the next several years" based on order backlogs, the AIA said. Order books for civil aircraft makers such as Boeing Co (BA.N), the world's largest maker of commercial jetliners and military aircraft combined, now contain a six- to seven-year backlog, the report said. U.S. military purchases of hardware may decline slowly or be hit with indiscriminate, sequester-related cuts that could cause major disruptions in the supply chain, especially for smaller manufacturers, the AIA said. Sequestration clouded the outlook for 2013 and was hard to factor in because of unknowns about how mandated cuts would be carried out, Marion Blakey, AIA's president and chief executive, told an industry luncheon. "It's an industry that remains healthy despite the obstacles," she said. For 2013, overall sales are projected to rise 2.6 percent to $223.6 billion from an estimated $217.9 billion this year. In 2012, the estimated total was up 3.4 percent from $210.8 billion the year before. Leading U.S. aerospace companies and top Pentagon suppliers include Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N), Boeing, Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC.N), BAE Systems Plc (BAES.L), Raytheon Co (RTN.N) and General Dynamics Corp (GD.N). Roughly $600 billion in combined U.S. tax increases and spending cuts are to take effect in January for fiscal 2013 alone - the so-called fiscal cliff - unless President Barack Obama and Republicans in Congress strike an alternative debt-reduction deal. The across-the board spending cut, known as sequestration, would cull about $54 billion from U.S. national security spending with purchases of weapons nipped, the trade group said, an estimated 10.3 percent. Demand for U.S. military exports is anticipated to remain strong for the new years, AIA said, citing concerns about Iran's disputed nuclear program as contributing to large purchases by oil-rich Gulf states, among other factors.

#### Aerospace industry resilient – cuts prove

Pae, 06 – LA Times staff writer (“Aerospace Industry Strong Despite Cuts”, Sept. 5th, 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/05/business/fi-defense5>)

Somber headlines and gloomy forecasts have cast a pall over much of Southern California's aerospace industry, leaving tens of thousands of workers with an understandable sense of vertigo. In the last several months Boeing Co. has shuttered the 717 jetliner plant in Long Beach and, bowing to a lack of new orders, taken the first steps toward shutting the neighboring line that churns out C-17 cargo planes. About 6,000 jobs would be lost or reclassified. Last week the aerospace giant and its project partner Northrop Grumman Corp., both with large local workforces, lost a contract potentially worth $8.1 billion to build the next-generation manned spacecraft for NASA. The winner, Lockheed Martin Corp., plans to do the work in Texas, Louisiana and Florida. "There does seem to be a lot of scary talk out there," said Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with aerospace research firm Teal Group Corp. of Fairfax, Va. One analyst has even begun to assert that the military side of aerospace, which has been surging since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, has reached a plateau. "I would expect that major defense contractors will be announcing incremental drops in employment in Los Angeles," said Loren Thompson, a defense policy analyst for the Lexington Institute, a think tank in Arlington, Va. "The money is beginning to be tight." Should the regional industry brace for a downturn? Not so fast, executives and analysts say. Despite the recent setbacks, the aerospace industry here remains strong and will continue to grow for the foreseeable future, they say. It will just look different. In their view, the shutdown of the 717 line and the expected end of the C-17 in 2009 will merely complete a transformation decades in the making. Once the bastion of blue-collar metal-bending aircraft manufacturing, the region has evolved into the nation's center for white-collar advanced electronics development. Although big manufacturing plants are mostly gone, thousands of suppliers in Southern California are profiting by making electronic components and other precision parts for commercial aircraft makers and defense contractors. After a several-year lull amid the worst downturn since the advent of air travel, major carriers are ordering planes again. Aerospace and defenserelated shipments have surged since hitting bottom after the terrorist attacks grounded civil aviation, according to the Aerospace Industries Assn. The trade group projects that the value of shipments will grow to $176.9 billion this year, up 32% from a post-9/11 low of $133.7 billion in 2003. The backlog of unfilled orders is growing even faster, to a projected $279.9 billion this year, the Washington-based association said. That's a 45% jump from $192.4 billion in 2003. "We're on top of the mountain," said David Napier, the association's research director. Even if new orders decline, he said, the current backlog is "still going to be paying out for a number of years." In California the resurgence in orders has led to a sharp increase in jobs for aerospace engineers, to 24,330 last year from 16,010 in 2004, the state's Employment Development Department reported. And that tally doesn't give the full extent of regional employment in aerospace, because it excludes mechanical, electrical and other types of engineers who work in the industry. "Aerospace is still extremely strong here," said Dan Beck, a spokesman for Boeing's integrated defense systems unit. "It's just that it has evolved and transformed into something new," he said. "It may not be heavy industry building airplanes and rockets, but it is still going to be a formidable presence." In fact, Chicago-based Boeing remains the region's largest private employer, with 31,000 workers. Northrop Grumman, headquartered in Century City, employs 27,000 in Southern California. The region is still home to about a quarter of the nation's aerospace workforce of about 630,000. The industry association's tally doesn't include aerospace engineers who work at research centers such as Aerospace Corp. in El Segundo, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in La Canada Flintridge and HRL Laboratories in Malibu. Large numbers of civilian engineers also are stationed at Los Angeles Air Force Base, which houses the Space and Missile Systems Center, the Air Force's contracting arm for satellites and rockets; and Edwards Air Force Base, where new aircraft and equipment are tested. At Raytheon Co.'s sprawling El Segundo facility, 9,100 engineers design sophisticated radars, sensors and aircraft electronics, reflecting the changing face of aerospace in the region. Since 2002 the company's El Segundo workforce has grown by nearly 2,500. Even as Boeing was closing its 717 line, Raytheon was running out of room and was forced to lease space in nearby office buildings. In the last few years, "we've been in a huge growth rate," said Jon C. Jones, president of Raytheon's space and airborne systems unit. "I don't expect that to continue, but we are going to continue to hire." Jones foresees "healthy, steady" growth for the next five years, driven by the Pentagon's focus on surveillance equipment for unmanned spy planes such as the Global Hawk and the Predator, as well as new, more powerful radars for jet fighters. Lately, Raytheon engineers also have focused on developing equipment to detect and defuse improvised explosive devices of the type that have killed hundreds of U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The unit in El Segundo works on at least 1,000 programs, many of them classified, so it is financially buffered from the cancellation or paring of any one program, Jones said. This summer, for instance, the company laid off 200 engineers after a program was canceled, but most quickly returned to other jobs at the company. "There will probably be puts and takes as programs ebb and flow, but overall the numerical level will be pretty stable," Jones said of his workforce.

**Airpower doesn't deter – only ground forces are perceived**

**Allan, 94** (Charles, Air Force National Defense Fellow at the CSIS,"Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?" Washington Quarterly, Summer, 1994)

*Information.* As we have seen, imperfect information about a defender's commitment may be present for both the defender and the attacker. Prior to the crisis, the "intended deterrees [themselves] will not know how much of a politically and technically credible threat it would take to deter them" (Gray 1991, 14). In addition, as Arquilla and Davis point out (Arquilla and Davis 1992; Davis and Arquilla 1991), adversaries have historically discounted key elements of U.S. power such as strategic mobility, precision weapons, maritime power, and airpower due to lack of familiarity with these systems. Without understanding these elements of U.S. military strength, the regional aggressor will view the absence of U.S. heavy ground forces as evidence of a lack of both capability and commitment. Moreover, Adam Garfinkle (1992) asserts that third world leaders are frequently misled into overly optimistic views of their own forces' capabilities. Without clear recognition of U.S. power, deterrence cannot hold.

#### Status Quo solves Air Power

Friedman and Preble 10

(Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>)

We would also eliminate six fighter wing equivalents from the Air Force. There are three justifications for this cut. First, the Navy already provides enough airpower from the sea to deal with most wars.14 Second, the Air Force lacks enemies that challenge its air superiority. Third, advancements in weapons guidance greatly increased the destructive power of each airframe. These factors mean that the fighter capability we maintain is more than what is needed to support likely ground conflicts or conduct bombing raids. Because we want an offshore posture rather than a forward defense, we retain our current bomber and refueling tanker procurement plans. We also maintain the Air Force’s spending on unmanned aerial vehicles, given their flexibility and low cost relative to manned aircraft.

**Resource conflict won’t escalate**

**Salehyan, 07** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Northern Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August 2007, May 29th 2010, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>, KONTOPOULOS)

Dire scenarios like these may sound convincing, but they are misleading. Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments. Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters. Second, arguing that climate change is a root cause of conflict lets tyrannical governments off the hook. If the environment drives conflict, then governments bear little responsibility for bad outcomes. That’s why Ban Ki-moon’s case about Darfur was music to Khartoum’s ears. The Sudanese government would love to blame the West for creating the climate change problem in the first place. True, desertification is a serious concern, but it’s preposterous to suggest that poor rainfall—rather than deliberate actions taken by the Sudanese government and the various combatant factions—ultimately caused the genocidal violence in Sudan. Yet by Moon’s perverse logic, consumers in Chicago and Paris are at least as culpable for Darfur as the regime in Khartoum.

**There’s also no impact to decline**

**The Seattle Times, 08**

Economists disagree on the Doha round's potential benefits; estimates of economic gain that could have been reaped through additional trade range from $4 billion to $100 billion. Set against the rapid expansion of global trade to $13.6 trillion last year from $7.6 trillion five years ago, however, the bottom-line loss from Doha's failure is "not a market issue," said Julian Callow, an economist at Barclays Capital in London. Nor is the world on the edge of the kind of protectionist wave that ended the last period of globalization in the early 20th century and contributed to two world wars, analysts say. Countries are likely to go on negotiating bilateral trade deals with each other, such as the U.S.-South Korea free-trade deal earlier this year.

**No impact to hegemonic decline – their studies are wrong**

**MacDonald, 11** - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. **The** central **issue is whether** **prompt retrenchment** **is** **desirable** or probable. Some **pessimists counsel** that **retrenchment is** a **dangerous** policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert **Kagan**, for example, **warns, "A reduction** in defense spending . . . **would unnerve** American **allies and undercut** efforts to gain greater **cooperation**. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert **Kaplan** likewise **argues**, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on **being more of an offshore balancer**. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention **may encourage regional bullies**. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3 Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7 **These arguments have** **grim implications for** contemporary **international politics**. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, **if the pessimists are correct**, **politicians and interests groups in the U**nited **S**tates **will be** **unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments**. **Perceptions of weakness and** **declining U.S. credibility** **will encourage policymakers to** **hold on to burdensome overseas commitments**, **despite their high costs** in blood and treasure.9 **Policymakers** in Washington **will** **struggle to retire** **from profitless military engagements** and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11 In this article, **we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists**. To date **there has been** **neither a comprehensive study** **of great power retrenchment** **nor a study that lays out the case** for retrenchment **as a practical or probable policy**. **This article fills these gaps by** **systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers**. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, **we challenge the** retrenchment pessimists' **claim that** **domestic or international constraints** **inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench**. In fact, **when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers**, **peaceful retrenchment is the most common response**, **even over short time spans**. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. **When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies** or adversaries, **draw down** their military **obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations**. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, **great powers retrench for the same reason they expand**: the rigors of **great power politics compel them** to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and **declining great powers face** **powerful incentives to contract their interests in a** **prompt and proportionate manner.** Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that **great powers facing acute decline are** **less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes**. **Faced with diminishing resources**, **great powers** **moderate their foreign policy ambitions** **and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value**. **Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions** **of critics,** **retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. **Great powers** are able to **rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, **retrenchment can be successful**. **States that retrench** **often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers**. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

**U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace—their data is flawed**

**Preble, 10** – Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO (Christopher, 8/3/10, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?”, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>, KONTOPOULOS)

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some **scholars**, however, **questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory** from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. **They advance arguments** **diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus.** **Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power**; **the** international **economy is** complex and **resilient**. **Supply disruptions are** likely to be **temporary**, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. **Islamic extremists are** scary, but **hardly comparable to the** threat posed by a globe-straddling **Soviet Union** armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. **Many factors** **have contributed to the** dramatic **decline in** the number of **wars** between nation-states; **it is** **unrealistic** **to expect** that **a new** **spasm of global conflict** **would erupt if the U**nited **S**tates **were to** modestly **refocus its efforts**, **draw down its military power**, **and call on other countries to play a larger role** in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while **there are** **credible alternatives** **to the U**nited **S**tates **serving in its** current dual **role as world policeman / armed social worker**, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

#### Heg decline is inevitable and trying to maintain heg makes transition worse

Pape 9 (Robert, Pape professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Empire Falls, National Interest, 1/22/09)

Clearly, major shifts in the balance of power in the international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America’s current predicament is far more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied, not by an even-steeper decline of our near-peer competitor, but rather by a 144 percent increase in China’s relative position. Further, the rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decades-long predominance. And with a rising China—with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology—a true peer competitor is looming. America’s current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall. The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. A true global hegemon is more powerful still—stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader. By these standards, America’s relative decline is fundamentally changing international politics, and is fundamentally different from Russia circa 1850 and Great Britain circa 1910. In current-U.S.-dollar terms—the preferred measure of the unipolar-dominance school—the United States has already fallen far from being a global hegemon and unipolarity itself is waning, since China will soon have as much economic potential to balance the United States as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States was indeed not only stronger than any other state individually, but its power relative to even the collective power of all other major states combined grew from 1990 to 2000. Although the growth was small, America almost reached the crucial threshold of 50 percent of major-power product necessary to become a true global hegemon. So it is understandable that we were lulled into a sense of security, believing we could do as we wished, whenever and wherever we wished. The instability and danger of the cold war quickly became a distant memory. Near the time of the Iraq War, it would have required virtually every major power to actively oppose the United States in order to assemble a counterbalancing coalition that could approximate America’s potential power. Under the circumstances, hard, military balancing against the United States was not a serious possibility. So, it is not surprising that major powers opted for soft-balancing measures—relying on institutional, economic and diplomatic tools to oppose American military power. And yet we are beginning to see “the conflict of history” repeat itself. Even with less relative power, in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional powers like Turkey, to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay, complicate and ultimately deny the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger. The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers. A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline—we should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war—or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power—has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet, waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history. The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked. As China rises, America must avoid this great-power trap. It would be easy to think that greater American military efforts could offset the consequences of China’s increasing power and possibly even lead to the formation of a multilateral strategy to contain China in the future. Indeed, when China’s economic star began to rise in the 1990s, numerous voices called for precisely this, noting that on current trajectories China would overtake the United States as the world’s leading economic power by 2050.8 Now, as that date draws nearer—indeed, current-dollar calculations put the crossover point closer to 2040—and with Beijing evermore dependent on imported oil for continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is all the stronger. Absent provocative military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S. military efforts to contain the rising power are most likely doomed to failure. China’s growth turns mainly on domestic issues—such as shifting the workforce from rural to urban areas—that are beyond the ability of outside powers to significantly influence. Although China’s growth also depends on external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit this vulnerability short of obviously hostile alliances (with India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and clearly aggressive military measures (controlling the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that together could deny oil to China. Any efforts along these lines would likely backfire—and only exacerbate America’s problems, increasing the risk of counterbalancing. Even more insidious is the risk of overstretch. This self-reinforcing spiral escalates current spending to maintain increasingly costly military commitments, crowding out productive investment for future growth. Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration’s plan for expanding NATO to Russia’s borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between America’s productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of America’s overstretched grand strategy? Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the world’s product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20 percent, it cannot. Yet, just withdrawing American troops from Iraq is not enough to put America’s grand strategy into balance. Even assuming a fairly quick and problem-free drawdown, the risks of instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region are likely to remain for many years to come. Further, even under the most optimistic scenarios, America is likely to remain dependent on imported oil for decades. Together, these factors point toward the Persian Gulf remaining the most important region in American grand strategy. So, as Europe and Asia continue to be low-order priorities, Washington must think creatively and look for opportunities to make strategic trades. America needs to share the burden of regional security with its allies and continue to draw down our troop levels in Europe and Asia, even considering the attendant risks. The days when the United States could effectively solve the security problems of its allies in these regions almost on its own are coming to an end. True, spreading defense burdens more equally will not be easy and will be fraught with its own costs and risks. However, this is simply part of the price of America’s declining relative power. The key principle is for America to gain international support among regional powers like Russia and China for its vital national-security objectives by adjusting less important U.S. policies. For instance, Russia may well do more to discourage Iran’s nuclear program in return for less U.S. pressure to expand NATO to its borders. And of course America needs to develop a plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvard’s Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to renew America’s environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to America’s new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the world will likely remain globally competitive. To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several years. There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon. Misguided efforts to extract more security from a declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment in the economy, trapping the state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma. This approach has done little for great powers in the past, and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy making. The United States is not just declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete**,** other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments.

#### No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

### EU Relations

**Protectionism won’t spiral out of control—interdependence**

**Marshall**, **09** (Andrew – asia political risk correspondent, Assault on free trade a key political risk, Reuters, 1/21/2009, p. lexis)

PREVENTING DISASTER Despite the risks, many analysts argue that a wholesale retreat into protectionism can be averted, because globalization has brought benefits governments will not want to reverse. "Fears that the financial crisis is ushering in an era of intensive nationalism and protectionism are overwrought," said Control Risks in its outlook for 2009. "The financial crisis has ... demonstrated that the global economy remains deeply interconnected and dependent on forging compromises between domestic politics and international capital." Cheap imports from emerging markets have brought significant benefits to consumers and companies in the developed world. "This factor, combined with the entrenched nature of global supply chains, is likely to **limit** the political **tolerance for protectionism**, at least in the main developed-country markets and in emerging markets that are highly dependent on exports," the Economist Intelligence Unit said.

#### The U.S. will never abandon free trade--institutions and self-interest check

**Ikenson, 09** – director of Cato's Center for Trade Policy Studies (Daniel, Center for Trade Policy Studies, Free Trade Bulletin 37, “A protectionism fling”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10651, WEA)

A Growing Constituency for Freer Trade The WTO/GATT system was created in the first place to deter a protectionist pandemic triggered by global economic contraction. It was created to deal with the very situation that is at hand. But in today's integrated global economy, those rules are not the only incentives to keep trade barriers in check. With the advent and proliferation of transnational supply chains, cross-border direct investment, multinational joint ventures, and equity tie-ups, the "Us versus Them" characterization of world commerce no longer applies. Most WTO members are happy to lower tariffs because imports provide consumers with lower prices and greater variety, which incentivizes local business to improve quality and productivity, which is crucial to increasing living standards. Moreover, many local economies now rely upon access to imported raw materials, components, and capital equipment for their own value-added activities. To improve chances to attract investment and talent in a world where capital (physical, financial, and human) is increasingly mobile, countries must maintain policies that create a stable business climate with limited administrative, logistical, and physical obstacles. The experience of India is instructive. Prior to reforms beginning in the 1990s, India's economy was virtually closed. The average tariff rate on intermediate goods in 1985 was nearly 150 percent. By 1997 the rate had been reduced to 30 percent. As trade barriers were reduced, imports of intermediate goods more than doubled. The tariff reductions caused prices to fall and Indian industry suddenly had access to components and materials it could not import previously. That access enabled Indian manufacturers to cut costs and use the savings to invest in new product lines, which was a process that played a crucial role in the overall growth of the Indian economy.16 India's approach has been common in the developing world, where most comprehensive trade reforms during the past quarter century have been undertaken unilaterally, without any external pressure, because governments recognized that structural reforms were in their country's interest. According to the World Bank, between 1983 and 2003, developing countries reduced their weighted average tariffs by almost 21 percentage points (from 29.9 percent to 9.3 percent) and unilateral reforms accounted for 66 percent of those cuts.17 The Indispensible Nation The United States accounts for the highest percentage of world trade and has the world's largest economy. The WTO/GATT system is a U.S.-inspired and U.S.-shaped institution. Recession in the United States has triggered a cascade of economic contractions around the world, particularly in export-dependent economies. Needless to say, U.S. trade policy is closely and nervously observed in other countries. But despite the occasional anti-trade rhetoric of the Democratic Congress and the protectionist-sounding campaign pledges of President Obama, the United States is unlikely to alter its strong commitment to the global trading system. There is simply too much at stake. Like businesses in other countries, U.S. businesses have become increasingly reliant on transnational supply chains. Over 55 percent of U.S. import value in 2007 was of intermediate goods, which indicates that U.S. producers depend highly on imported materials, components, and capital equipment. And there is also the fact that 95 percent of the world's population lives outside of the United States, so an open trade policy is an example to uphold.

#### The U.S. can credibly deter Iran

**Posen, 06** (Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, AlterNet, March 30, http://www.alternet.org/audits/34219/)

Some worry that Iran would be unconvinced by an American deterrent, choosing instead to gamble that the United States would not make good on its commitments to weak Middle Eastern states -- but the consequences of losing a gamble against a vastly superior nuclear power like the United States are grave, and they do not require much imagination to grasp.

#### No risk of Middle Eastern wars

**Fettweis, 07**(Christopher J. Professor of National Security Affairs @ Naval War College, 07 (Survival 49.4, “'On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,”)

No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare. Even a Turkish invasion of the north is hardly inevitable. Withdrawal from Iraq would, after all, hardly rob the United States of all its tools with which to influence events. Washington and the rest of NATO still wield significant influence over Ankara; a cross-border invasion would almost certainly doom Turkey’s prospects of entering the European Union. It is puzzling why anyone would think that no incentive structure could be devised to convince Turkey not to attack its neighbour. Should such an assault prove undeterrable, it is not clear that intervention would be in the strategic interest of the United States. One of the worst suggestions that occasionally surfaces in the withdrawal debate is that the United States should ‘redeploy’ troops to Kurdistan in northern Iraq, in order to ‘deter’ Turkey and reward its Kurdish allies.18 Such a move would allow a continuation of what amounts to state-sponsored terrorism, and risk embroiling the United States in yet another local, intractable conflict. The removal of de facto US protection would presumably encourage the Kurds to act more responsibly toward their more powerful neighbours, and may well prove to be good for stability. Clearly, elements in Kurdistan actively support Kurdistan Workers’ Party terrorists in Turkey, but that would change if they faced the possibility of paying a price for their behaviour. A regional descent into the whirlwind following a US withdrawal cannot be ruled out; using that logic, neither can benevolent transitions to democracy. Just because a scenario is imaginable does not make it likely. In fact, most of the chaotic outcomes pessimists predict require unprecedented breaks with the past. Since the United States has historically overestimated the threats it faces, there is every reason to believe that it is doing so again.